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RESPECTING RELEVANCE IN BELIEF CHANGE
DAVID MAKINSON AND GEORGE KOUROUSIAS
Abstract. In this paper dedicated to Carlos Alchourro´n, we review an issue
that emerged only after his death in 1996, but would have been of great interest
to him: To what extent do the formal operations of AGM belief change respect
criteria of relevance? A natural (but also debateable) criterion was proposed
in 1999 by Rohit Parikh, who observed that the AGM model does not always
respect it. We discuss the pros and cons of this criterion, and explain how the
AGM account may be refined, if we so desire, so that it is always respected.
1. Introduction
Named after the trio Carlos Alchourro´n, Peter Ga¨rdenfors and David Makinson
who introduced it in their paper of 1985, the AGM account of belief change oﬀers
a model of the logic of belief revision. Like many models, it is rather idealized. For
example, it considers the properties of ‘one-shot’ belief change, with scant attention
to further conditions that might be appropriate for iterated change. It is formulated
in terms of classical propositional logic, rather than some richer language such as
that of ﬁrst-order logic. It identiﬁes belief states with sets of formulae, rather than
with more complex items. Finally, it makes use of only deductive consequence
relations between propositions, disregarding any relations of uncertain inference.
These are major idealizations, and it is easy to dismiss the entire enterprise as too
simple for practical use. Yet it has shown itself to be surprisingly robust. Since 1985
many researchers have put their minds to relaxing some of its constraints, enriching
its apparatus and extending its scope, but these investigations have usually taken
the simple basic structure as their point of departure. It has turned out that
some of the enrichment problems are more recalcitrant than one might imagine
– witness, for example, the lack on consensus on the many diﬀerent accounts of
iterated revision.
The basic AGM approach thus remains a starting point for fresh journeys, and
a platform for novel constructions. In this paper we will see how it may be reﬁned
in order to respect an interesting criterion of relevance due to Parikh 1999. The
reﬁnement leads us to a new concept of classical logic, which is signiﬁcant quite
independently of the context of belief change: that of parallel interpolation.
Our purpose is to highlight the general ideas, and so we omit all proofs. These
may be found in the more technical paper Kourousias and Makinson (to appear).
However, we will need to assume some familiarity with classical propositional logic
and also with AGM theory, in particular the AGM notions of partial meet contrac-
tion and revision.
The notation is essentially the same as that of the AGM 1985 paper itself. For-
mulae of classical propositional logic are indicated by lower-case Latin letters, sets
of formulae by upper-case ones. Classical consequence is written as Cn when seen
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as an operation and as  when taken as a relation. Classical equivalence as a rela-
tion is written as . The only diﬀerences with the notation of the 1985 paper are
that we use an asterisk for the revision operation and a plain subtraction sign for
contraction, in accord with current conventions.
2. Revision via Contraction
Suppose we begin with a belief set K, and wish to introduce a proposition x
that is inconsistent with K, in such a manner that the resulting belief set contains
x, but is nevertheless consistent if x itself is. This process is known as revision,
and its subtlety arises from the fact that unlike simple closure under consequence,
it can have more than one outcome. It is usually analysed into two steps.
• First, reduce K enough that it is no longer inconsistent with x (i.e. no
longer implies ¬x), but without throwing away more than is strictly nec-
essary for the task. This step is known as contraction, and can also have
more than one possible outcome.
• The second step is to take the result K − (¬x) of the contraction, which
we write without brackets as K − ¬x, add the input proposition x to get
(K−¬x)∪{x}, and then close under classical consequence, getting Cn((K−
¬x)∪{x}), written more brieﬂy as (K −¬x) +x. This second step, known
as expansion, is evidently fully determinate, and quite unproblematic in so
far as one is happy with classical consequence as a formalization of logical
implication.
Revision is identiﬁed with the result of carrying out the two steps in that order:
K ∗x is deﬁned as (K−¬x)+x, i.e. as Cn((K−¬x)∪{x})). If one is working with
bases rather than sets closed under consequence, the second step is even simpler –
we omit the application of Cn.
The analysis of revision into two steps, of contraction followed by expansion, is
due to the philosopher Isaac Levi 1980, and the deﬁnition K ∗ x = (K −¬x) + x is
accordingly known as the Levi identity. The essential contribution of Alchourro´n,
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson in 1985 was to throw light on the underlying process
of contraction. They introduced certain regularity conditions (often referred to as
the AGM postulates) that contraction may plausibly be taken to satisfy despite
its indeterminacy, and showed that those conditions are characterized by a speciﬁc
kind of construction using intersections of maximal non-implying subsets, known as
partial meet contraction. The Levi identity then permits us to pass from contraction
to revision in a straightforward manner, on both the syntactic and semantic levels.
In what follows we will also work with contraction, drawing corresponding results
for revision as corollaries.
3. Parikh’s Criterion for Relevance in Belief Change
In 1999, Rohit Parikh observed that changes carried out using the AGM model
may fail a natural criterion of relevance. They may discard more than they should,
by eliminating from K items that are, in this sense, irrelevant to the inconsistency
of K with the formula being introduced or discarded.
Parikh formulated the observation in terms of revision, but it may equally well
be made in terms of contraction, as we will here. Moreover, it can be made irrespec-
tive of whether we are taking belief sets as sets already closed under classical conse-
quence, or as arbitrary sets of formulae (belief bases) that need not be closed. Let
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K be any set of formulae of classical propositional logic. Suppose K  ⋃{Bi}i∈I
where for any two distinct i,j ∈ I, no elementary letter occurs in both some formula
in Bi and some formula in Bj . That is, writing E(Bi) for the set of all elementary
letters occurring in formulae in Bi, suppose that the E(Bi) are pairwise disjoint.
Let x be a formula that we wish to contract from K. Following Parikh 1999, we say
that a formula a is irrelevant to x (modulo the representation of K as
⋃{Bi}i∈I)
iﬀ there is no Ei that contains both some letter occurring in x and some (possibly
diﬀerent) letter occurring in a. Finally, we say that a is irrelevant to x (modulo K
itself) iﬀ there is some such representation of K, modulo which a is irrelevant to x.
It should be noted that this notion of irrelevance has nothing to do with so-
called ‘relevance logics’, which are certain subsystems of classical logic that are too
weak for contradictions to imply all formulae or for arbitrary formulae to imply
tautologies. Parikh’s deﬁnition of irrelevance is formulated in terms of classical
logic alone.
Note also that we are really working with a three-place relation, of a being irrele-
vant to x modulo a third term. This third term is in the ﬁrst place a representation
of the set K of formulae as a letter-disjoint family; then, via existential quantiﬁca-
tion over those families, K itself. We will see shortly that the latter step can be
reformulated using Parikh’s ‘ﬁnest splitting theorem’.
4. How AGM Contraction Can Fail Parikh’s Criterion
As Parikh observed, an AGM contraction (indeed, we add, even a maxichoice
AGM contraction) K − x can eliminate formulae that are irrelevant to x modulo
K. We give a quite trivial example.
Let p,q be two distinct elementary letters, and put K = Cn(p, q). Then there is
an AGM maxichoice contraction that puts K−p to be Cn(p↔ q), thus eliminating
not only p but also q from K. However, the letter q is irrelevant to p modulo K.
This is because the representation of K by {p, q} puts E1 = {p}, E2 = {q}, and
neither of these two sets contains both of the letters p and q.
The example is robust in the sense that it goes through even if we work with
belief bases rather than belief sets already closed under consequence. Put K0 =
{p ↔ q, q}, so that Cn(K0) = K above. Then one of the AGM maxichoice base
contractions puts K0−p to be {p↔ q}, which eliminates q. However, the letter q is
irrelevant to p modulo K0 because there is another representation of K0 as {p, q},
which puts E1 = {p}, E2 = {q}, and neither of these two sets contains both of the
letters p and q.
5. Should Parikh’s Criterion be Respected?
Of course, the question arises whether the elimination of irrelevant formulae as
deﬁned by Parikh is really undesirable. Is the failure of AGM to satisfy the criterion
really a shortcoming? In the authors’ view, this question does not have a categorical
answer. Violation of this kind of relevance will be undesirable in some contexts but
may be perfectly acceptable in others, depending on the epistemic policy guiding
the contraction.
Consider the same example, where we are contracting the letter p from the closed
belief setK = Cn(p, q), or from its baseK0 = {p↔ q, q}. If we are working with the
base, we may perhaps regard it as supplying us with epistemic information, namely
that its elements are particularly important items that deserve to be protected more
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than other items not appearing in it. But even so, the base gives us no information
to discriminate between its elements. In the example K0 = {p ↔ q, q}, we are
not told explicitly that the elementary letter q deserves protection more than the
biconditional p ↔ q. We may wish to allow the possibility that the latter is more
deeply entrenched, less vulnerable, than the former. In that case, when we discard
p we will jettison the letter q and keep the biconditional, regardless of the fact that
q is irrelevant to p modulo K in the sense that Parikh has deﬁned.
On the other hand, there may be occasions in which we wish to treat elementary
letters systematically as the only carriers of epistemic signiﬁcance. In the authors’
view, this policy is diﬃcult to justify in theoretical terms, but it sometimes appears
to be adopted for reasons of computational convenience in contexts of artiﬁcial
intelligence. In this situation, regardless of whether we are working with belief
bases or closed belief sets, we would want to preserve relevance in the sense of
Parikh when contracting.
In summary: AGM contraction, even when maxichoice, can eliminate formulae
that are irrelevant to the formula being discarded modulo the belief set undergoing
contraction, in the sense that Parikh has deﬁned. This is not necessarily undesir-
able: in some contexts it may be just what we want to allow. But in some others
we may wish to prevent it.
6. How to Make AGM Contraction Respect Parikh’s Criterion
So the question arises: Is it possible to reﬁne the AGM operations so as to
guarantee that relevance is respected?
Parikh and collaborators have approached this problem from a postulational
perspective (see Chopra et al 2000, Peppas et al 2004): what conditions should
be added to the AGM postulates to ensure that relevance is always respected? In
our view, it is more perspicuous to approach it semantically: in what way may the
operation of partial meet contraction be tweaked so as to ensure respect?
To answer this question, we make use of a tool that Parikh has also supplied:
his ‘ﬁnest splitting theorem’. Consider again any set K of formulae of classical
propositional logic. Let {Ei}i∈I be any partition of the set E of all elementary
letters of the language. We say that {Ei}i∈I is a splitting of K iﬀ there is a family
{Bi}i∈I of sets of formulae with each E(Bi) ⊆ Ei and K 
⋃{Bi}i∈I . Following
customary terminology, we can say that one partition is at least as ﬁne as another
iﬀ every cell of the latter is the union of cells of the former; equivalently, iﬀ the
equivalence relation associated with the former is a sub-relation of that associated
with the latter.
In his 1999 paper Parikh showed that in the ﬁnite case (i.e. the case where
the language has only ﬁnitely many elementary letters), every set K of formulae
has a unique ﬁnest splitting. It is also possible to prove the result for the inﬁnite
case. Note that with this ﬁnest splitting theorem in hand one can streamline the
deﬁnition of irrelevance itself, getting rid of the existential quantiﬁcation. A formula
a is irrelevant to x (modulo K) iﬀ in the unique finest splitting {Ei}i∈I of K there
is no Ei that contains both some letter occurring in x and some (possibly diﬀerent)
letter occurring in a. This is, in fact, the way that Parikh originally deﬁned it.
How can the ﬁnest splitting theorem be used to make AGM contraction respect
relevance? By not applying the operation directly to K itself, but rather to a
representation of it in terms of its ﬁnest splitting. In other words, given a set K
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of formulae and a formula x that we wish to discard from it, we ﬁrst consider its
unique ﬁnest splitting {Ei}i∈I and a set K ′ =
⋃{Bi}i∈I where each E(Bi) ⊆ Ei
and K  ⋃{Bi}i∈I . We then perform an AGM contraction on K ′, obtaining
K ′ − x.
The ﬁrst of these two steps may be thought of as a preliminary ‘massaging’ of
K, to get it into a normal form K ′, which we call the finest form of K. Strictly
speaking, it is not unique: there may be many such families {Bi}i∈I , but they will
all have the same letter-set family {Ei}i∈I , namely the unique ﬁnest splitting of K,
and that is all that matters.
Note that even when K is closed under classical consequence, i.e. K = Cn(K),
neither the individual sets Bi nor their union K ′ =
⋃{Bi}i∈I will in general be so.
Contraction on a closed set is thus reconstrued as contraction of a canonical base
for it.
It can be shown that when an AGM (partial meet) contraction is performed
on the ﬁnest form K ′ of K then it always respects relevance: it never eliminates
from K ′ any formula a that is irrelevant to the discarded formula x in the sense
of Parikh. That is, whenever a is irrelevant to x (modulo K ′), then if a ∈ K ′ to
start with, still a ∈ K ′ − x. For the proof, we refer the reader to Kourousias and
Makinson (to appear).
The corresponding result for revision follows immediately: whenever a is irrel-
evant to x (modulo K ′), then if a ∈ K ′ to start with, still a ∈ K ′ ∗ x. For by
the deﬁnition of revision from contraction using the Levi identity, K ′ ∗ x equals
(K ′ − ¬x) ∪ {x} or its closure Cn((K ′ − ¬x) ∪ {x}). Since the elementary letters
occurring in ¬x are just the same as those occurring in x, a is irrelevant to x iﬀ
it is irrelevant to ¬x (modulo K ′ each time), so the result for contraction tells us
that a ∈ K ′ − ¬x ⊆ (K ′ − ¬x) ∪ {x} ⊆ Cn((K ′ − ¬x) ∪ {x}) and we are done.
To avoid any misunderstanding, it should however be emphasized that these
results do not give us any guidance on which contraction or revision operation we
should apply to the ﬁnest form K ′ of K, even if we already have one for K. All
they do is tell us that whatever AGM belief change operation we apply to K ′, it
will respect Parikh’s relevance criterion.
7. Parallel Interpolation in Classical Logic
In the preceding section we remarked that while Parikh proved the ﬁnest splitting
theorem for the ﬁnite case, it can be extended to cover the inﬁnite case as well.
The proof is rather intricate, and we do not wish to describe it here. But we do
want to draw attention to an interesting aspect: it can be carried out elegantly
using a hitherto unnoticed strengthening of the well-known interpolation theorem
for classical propositional logic.
The standard interpolation theorem (also known as Craig’s Lemma) tells us that
whenever K  x there is a formula b all of whose elementary letters are common to
K and to x, such that K  b  x.
Now consider the case where K  ∪{Bi}i∈I where the sets Ei = E(Bi) are
pairwise disjoint. Suppose
⋃{Bi}i∈I  x.
We know from the standard interpolation theorem that there is a formula b all of
whose elementary letters are common to
⋃{Bi}i∈I and to x, such that K  b  x.
But since the sets Bi do not separately imply x, interpolation does not tell us
immediately whether we may treat the Bi in parallel, i.e. whether we can ﬁnd
6 D. MAKINSON AND G. KOUROUSIAS
formulae bi such that all of the elementary letters in each bi are common to Bi and
x, such that Bi  bi and {bi}i∈I  x, as in Figure 1 below.
1( )E B
2( )E B
( )nE B
... ...
1( )E b
2( )E b
( )nE b
1B
2B
nB
1b
2b
nb
i
i I
B

*
x
( )iE B ( ) ( ) ( )i iE b E B E x 
{ }i
i I
b

*
... ...
Figure 1. Parallel Interpolation
It turns out that parallel interpolation does hold for classical propositional and
ﬁrst-order logic. This can be proven by a direct argument but, as shown by Georg
Gottlob (personal communication), it is simpler to obtain it by iterated applications
of standard interpolation. The details are given in Kourousias and Makinson (to
appear).
In this way, the investigation of a rather specialized problem in the logic of
theory change that would have been of close interest to Carlos, namely the extent
to which AGM belief revision operations respect relevance, leads us back into fresh
views of classical logic. It led to an important theorem of Parikh (the ﬁnest splitting
theorem) and its extension to the inﬁnite case, and also takes us to an interesting
strengthening of one of the fundamental theorems of classical logic (interpolation).
8. Final Remark
Despite all the accomplishments of the last century and a half, we see that
there are still new things to be discovered in such an elementary area as classical
propositional logic - not just matters of detail but also general concepts. Parallel
interpolation and ﬁnest splitting are not the only examples; another is the concept
of ‘logical friendliness’. But that is another story, for which we refer the reader to
Makinson 2005.
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